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Lessons from the Housing Design Awards 2026: Challenging Convention and Breaking the Mould
On 23 September, the 2026 winners of the Housing Design Awards were announced at Tuke Hall, Regent's University London. The annual awards showcase residential schemes that not only demonstrate design excellence but also provide practical lessons for creating better places and communities. 
One standout lesson linked many of this year’s winning residential schemes: delivering high-quality homes and well-designed places can require us to challenge established planning and design conventions – and to have the tenacity, commitment and determination to see that challenge through.
This three-part blog series will review many of the 2026 winning schemes to highlight what different design teams did and how that resulted in better outcomes. 
 
Part 1: Challenging planning policy and a site allocation
Benfield Valley, Hangleton Lane, Hove
Planning permission was granted in September 2026 for a mixed-use residential, community, heritage and landscape-led development comprising 101 homes, including 40% affordable. 
The scheme challenged the Local Plan's split-site housing allocation for circa 100 homes (approximately 60 homes north and 40 homes south of Hangleton Lane) by proposing a better way to achieve the two key objectives set out in the allocations: the delivery of approximately 100 homes and the protection and enhancement of Benfield Valley's landscape, ecology, open space and heritage assets. The proposed alternative design approach therefore sought to deliver the same overall housing quantum in a more consolidated and compact form to the north of Hangleton Lane, freeing up the entirety of the southern allocation to remain and be enhanced as public open space.
However, a key planning challenge for the consolidated scheme was that it expanded the site boundary beyond the allocated northern parcel and into land designated as Local Green Space (LGS). This encroachment triggered the need to demonstrate ‘very special circumstances’ in which the public benefits of the proposed development would outweigh the harm caused by development within the LGS. The key question was whether ‘very special circumstances’ existed to justify development within the LGS, having regard to whether the consolidated scheme represented a more effective way of protecting and enhancing Benfield Valley's landscape, ecology, open space and heritage assets, and of complying with other relevant Development Plan policies, than the adopted split-site allocation.
To answer this question, the merits of both the split-site option, as set out in the allocations, and the consolidated-site option were analysed at the pre-application stage and tested with the Design Review Panel (DRP). Overall, DRP members considered the consolidated scheme to present a “compelling case” in terms of placemaking benefits. This was achieved by:
  • Retaining the entire southern allocation as a public park secured as a community asset in perpetuity.
     
  • Designing improvements to the recreational quality of the park including improved access routes, seating, signage, new footpaths aligned with existing desire lines, enhanced BMX track provision and informal play.
     
  • Proposing ecological improvements and retaining strong landscape buffers and wildlife corridors.
     
  • Proposing the long-term management and maintenance of open spaces, wildlife habitats, landscape, woodland and heritage assets. 
     
  • Proposing a layout which moved development away from the protected woodland and protected trees.
     
  • Creating a higher density layout without proposing taller buildings by using innovative housing typologies, a compact urban form, a mix of houses and flats and efficient plot layouts. This avoided the need for site access in the south and meant the existing site access could be used.
     
  • The proposed compact and consolidated layout has a lower carbon footprint and is less carbon-intensive to construct than the split-site option because it requires fewer roads and utility runs, less excavation and earthworks, and less site preparation and enabling infrastructure.
     
  • Designing homes around a community core comprising a central community square, community floorspace and uses within the new marker building and restored Grade II listed barn, allotments, orchard areas and informal play areas.
Overall, the consolidated design is landscape-led and delivers greater ecological, placemaking and community benefits than the split-site option would – without reducing the site allocation’s housing number requirement. Together, these benefits provided a compelling justification for the alternative design approach and departing from the adopted site allocation policy.
 
Challenging planning policy and a conventional view
 
Farmstead Road, Bellingham, Lewisham
Planning permission was granted in January 2023 for the demolition of existing buildings and the comprehensive redevelopment of the site to provide 24 affordable homes with associated landscaping, access, parking, cycle storage, refuse facilities and a substation.
The site is a backland and infill development plot within Bellingham Estate in Lewisham, which is a non-designated heritage asset as an Area of Special Local Character (ASLC).
Bellingham Estate is predominantly residential and was built by the London County Council between 1920 and 1923. Bellingham Estate was designed as a ‘Garden Estate’ that took inspiration from Ebenezer Howard's Garden City Movement, a “concept of affordable housing in a green and healthy environment, a coherent vision for the living environment and a strong sense of community”. The masterplan has a formal radial street pattern that extends out from Bellingham Green at its centre, with perimeter blocks of terraced cottages, semi-detached cottages and flats set within generous garden plots. Homes are predominantly two storeys high, with an Arts and Crafts architectural style, symmetrical features and a brown-and-red-brick material palette.
Backland and infill development sites often face planning policy resistance because of the difficulty of designing schemes that protect neighbouring amenity, respond positively to local character and deliver high-quality accommodation. This was true of this scheme because the Development Management Local Plan (2014) for Lewisham (now superseded) opposed the development of separate dwellings in the back gardens of specific ‘perimeter block’ urban typologies, such as Bellingham Estate. For decades, the mainstream planning consensus has been that these sites often constitute “town cramming” or “garden grabbing”. This is a Howardian perspective: the conventional view that filling urban gaps is harmful stems from the Garden City belief that compressing more housing into an existing footprint removes the “breathing room” necessary for wellbeing. Today, planning policy is shifting, as the new NPPF supports the effective use of land, including sensitive redevelopment or additional development within existing plots (Policy L2), and encourages appropriate increases in scale and density where the principles of well-designed places can be met (Policy DP3). However, this scheme not only had to challenge this conventional view and a local plan policy before today's more favourable NPPF; it also had to preserve Bellingham Estate as an ASLC.
This scheme successfully demonstrates how to create a context-led and well-designed place that promotes wellbeing while making effective use of land and optimising density. Moreover, the scheme demonstrates how two competing urban planning paradigms – the Garden City and the Compact City/urban intensification – can be aligned. This is achieved by:
  • The two gatehouse buildings create a welcoming frontage and site entrance, establish a street presence and integrate the scheme into the wider estate. The symmetrical pair echoes the ordered and balanced character of the estate's existing buildings.
     
  • The butterfly building was designed to follow the radial geometry of Bellingham Estate, making it feel related and connected to the estate by following its urban grain. The building's mass is broken into articulated wings and bays, complementing the rhythmic character of the estate's terraces and creating separation between neighbouring properties. It is also intentionally asymmetrical and inward-facing to safeguard neighbouring amenity and reduce overlooking. The building form also creates more dual- and triple-aspect homes with improved daylight, outlook and ventilation.
     
  • The buildings are arranged to create a coherent place and a series of connected shared green spaces that promote social interaction and strengthen community. The landscape strategy creates a green environment and supports quieter places to sit, areas for play and exercise, and spaces to meet friends and neighbours. The two wings of the butterfly building enclose the central courtyard and communal garden, ensuring that these amenity spaces are overlooked.
     
  • The roof forms, chimney features, brick detailing and façade composition complement the estate's Arts and Crafts architectural language.
The scheme's high-quality affordable homes, shared green spaces that promote social interaction and wellbeing, and contextually integrated built form, layout and appearance exemplify how a backland and infill development can achieve the core Garden City values of health, landscape and neighbourliness.
 
Concluding thoughts
Better outcomes for communities are not always achieved by following conventional paths, default options or the status quo. These two exemplary schemes demonstrate the value of challenging planning policy where an alternative design approach can better meet residential development objectives. Both show that questioning established planning and design conventions can unlock more effective ways to deliver the homes and places in which communities can thrive. 
 
Part 2…
The next blog will review winning schemes that challenged more typical approaches often seen when developing homes on sites with particular constraints and circumstances in order to achieve high-quality, well-designed homes and places.  

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The million-home policy solutions and the missing theory of change
“There is always a well-known solution to every human problem: neat, plausible, and wrong.”
This 1917 quote from satirist H.L. Mencken came to mind when I read the Times 21st October piece summarising the new Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) and Create Streets report.[1] The Times reported the advocated approach would enable 4.6 million homes to be built: “without harming the green belt [and] avoid damage to farming or the environment.”[2]
It would be unfair to suggest the CPS/Create Streets report is “wrong”. There is in fact much to agree about it: Green Belt designation is not a proxy for landscape quality, biodiversity, agricultural value or public access. There are plainly locations where legacy Green Belt boundaries are no longer sensible in view of growth needs. Development around rail stations is generally preferable to pushing housing beyond the Green Belt into more car-dependent locations. The report also recognises that what it describes as “intuitive grey belt” (the archetypal derelict petrol stations, abandoned depots and other obviously brownfield sites) is only a small proportion of the Green Belt release necessary.
But the report (or more how it was headlined in the Times) points indirectly at a wider problem. Analysis of solutions to the housing crisis often comes with very large numbers associated with individual policy changes (in this case, 4.6 million homes) attracting headlines, as intended.
It is not that the individual ideas or studies are necessarily wrong: most capture a tangible opportunity. The problem is:

  1. that the apparent precision and certainty of the answer (such as 4.6 million homes) – at least in the public debate - can conceal how dependent it is on assumptions; and

  2. the size of the prize it dangles in front of policy makers can lead people to treat measures that are complements as substitutes for other things that are also needed.

The CPS/Create Streets report is a good example of the first. Some other recent contributions to the housing debate provide examples of the second.


The challenge of assumptions

The new CPS/Create Streets report raises some good points: its spatial work is a useful reminder that not every Green Belt field is environmentally off-limits or that fragments of brownfield land alone can meet the need; it recognises that the Government's adopted 800-metre station policy will capture only a subset of the wider opportunity; and it explores what might happen if the radius were expanded to 1,200 metres and attention shifted from existing stations to railway lines where new stations might be created.[3]
These are legitimate avenues to explore, but the journey from mapped land to the headline 4.6 million homes relies on the upper end of its assumptions. The report identifies 152,347 hectares of low- or medium-quality agricultural land within 1,200 metres of railway lines. The report says its calculations assume 35 dwellings per hectare (dph) and development on 60 per cent of the land (a typical development platform, accounting for land needed for infrastructure and open space). Those inputs produce about 3.2 million homes. The 4.6 million figure is generated only by applying 50 homes per hectare to 60 per cent of the land.[4] That matters because the Government expressly reduced its minimum density around rail stations in the NPPF from 50 dph to 35 dph because:
“Some respondents ... considered they could create viability and market demand challenges in some locations, particularly where density requirements rely on partially flatted development to come forward. Some respondents thought that more rural locations, and areas with lower land values, could be most affected by these challenges.”[5]
In other words, in many of the locations suggested in the report, these densities are going to be unviable.
Of course, three million homes of theoretical capacity is still a very large number. Nor is 50 dph too high in every rail-connected location. The point is that the result is assumption-led. Changes to density, developable area, or the distinction between proximity to a railway line and genuine accessibility can add or subtract hundreds of thousands of homes from the estimate before any developer has tested a site’s feasibility. Treating all Grade 3 agricultural land as 'medium quality' obscures the distinction between Grade 3a, which forms part of the best and most versatile agricultural resource, and Grade 3b, which does not. Once one reflects site-specific constraints, actual walking routes, land assembly, infrastructure, railway capacity and the requirement for viable places, and the number will move again.
The report's move from the Government’s NPPF focus on well-connected stations to railway lines further illustrates the point. A 1,200-metre geometric buffer around a line identifies a useful search area, but a railway line is not a station where people can access the train, a new station must be funded and services timetabled without compromising the wider network.
Where new stations are realistic, the land value created by development may help fund them as the report advocates. Metro-land is an appealing precedent.[6] But once the proposition relies on land assembly, a new station, enhanced railway capacity, schools, utilities and roads, it has become a major infrastructure and delivery programme.


Capacity vs delivery

 

This brings us to perhaps the fundamental issue: the gap between physical capacity, planning capacity and delivery capacity.[7] Spatial analysis can identify land where homes might fit, but planning must determine whether those locations can make coherent new neighbourhoods and how impacts will be addressed. Delivery then depends on landowner participation, infrastructure, utilities, finance, public sector capacity, demand and the rate at which different tenures can be absorbed.
The delivery part is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain. Brownfield land exists without being viable. Rail lines can exist without technical ability to introduce a new station. Local-plan allocations can exist without infrastructure funding. Planning permissions can exist for unviable developments in a failing land market. Planned s.106 affordable homes can exist without Registered Provider demand to buy them. Removing one constraint may simply reveal the next.
This is not a reason to do nothing, but it is a reason to ask demanding questions about the practicalities and timing of posited ideas. Without those answers, capacity is useful evidence, but it is not the same as an effective policy.


Policy measures as additives not substitutes

Now to the second problem: there can be a familiar pattern in debates over the housing crisis: an important piece of evidence about the benefits or impacts of one lever acquires a headline number, and that is then argued to be as a reason to not also pull the other. A few examples:
  1. Brownfield land is the archetype: CPRE's ‘State of Brownfield 2025’ identifies minimum capacity for 1.41 million homes on previously developed land in England, including 770,000 on sites with some form of planning permission.[8] This is routinely taken to support a further proposition: because 1.4 million homes can be accommodated on brownfield land, substantial greenfield or Green Belt release is unnecessary or can be reduced.[9] Yet 1.4 million is less than five years of what is needed. Our progress report on building out land on the 2021 Brownfield Registers suggests some of the 1.4m potential homes already existed at the base date and at most half of the capacity is deliverable within 15 years. Further, the late 1990s policy fixation on brownfield was associated with a precipitous collapse in housing delivery.

  2. The same danger can arise in tenure debates and the widely recognised need to increase the supply of affordable homes, including for social rent. Whilst few reputable bodies would suggest there is no need to also increase the supply of market homes,[10] the active role of market housing in meeting need is often overlooked – or even denigrated - by some in the debate.[11]  And yet the strategic economic and fiscal case for more Social Rent housing recently cited by the Prime Minister is fundamentally dependent on delivering significantly more private homes than currently.[12]

  3. New Towns or Garden Cities have been discussed in similar terms. They are important components for a serious long-term supply strategy, but a programme of large new settlements will mature over decades and cannot remove the need for urban extensions, brownfield regeneration, intensification or smaller sites, at least in the meantime. Yet the CPRE in 2025 said areas with New Towns should have their housing targets “radically reduced” to reflect the huge changes to their communities that a new town will bring.[13]

  4. The supply-side planning reforms launched by the Government in 2024-2026 – much needed and positive as they were for development - were sometimes cited as having fulfilled everything the industry said was required, and the-then Prime Minister said what was now needed was for developers to just “get on with it”.[14] Yet, from the beginning, it was always clear the situation was more complex.[15] The Government has subsequently had to play ‘wack-a-mole’ on a host of other barriers to housing delivery,[16] Most recently, the current market downturn has led - after sustained pressure - to a return to demand-side support via its Your First Home scheme.[17]

  5. Public sector land assembly is another: some propose that if the state taxed land differently, or bought it closer to existing use value, it could capture the uplift itself and boost supply.[18] Some have argued more public sector intervention in the land market would “weaken the power of the speculative housing delivery model.”[19] Of course, where scale or fragmented ownership defeat the market, as with New Towns and comprehensive regeneration, more public sector intervention may be right. But CPO is a scarce, slow and contested instrument. Only 61 were confirmed by authorities in England in 2024.[20] Public land assembly can do more, but most homes – built on literally hundreds of sites every year - will still need to come from land that promoters and housebuilders option, promote and build out. And of course, it still needs an effective planning system.

The popular attraction of the single answer – especially that with a big number - is understandable: concentrate the growth or responsibility somewhere else and reduce the pressure on other parts of the system.  Unfortunately, real world housing delivery is not quite so obliging.


The missing theory of change

Housing policy does not suffer from a shortage of individual ideas. It suffers from an insufficiently integrated account of how they might fit together, how different factors combine to raise output, and the critical limitations and interdependencies. A ‘theory of change’ would provide that account.[21]
It works backwards from the required output, through the delivery chain from planned idea to actual homes built, and makes explicit the causal links, assumptions and binding constraints involved at each stage. It would identify the potential contribution of private sale, Social Rent, other affordable tenures, build-to-rent, specialist housing and self-build. It would identify the land required from brownfield regeneration, urban intensification, suburban renewal, Green Belt review, urban extensions, station growth and New Towns. It would then test the enabling conditions for each: plan coverage, land assembly, infrastructure, public investment, development finance, utilities, skills and market demand.
It would also recognise geography and time. A home in a low-demand market is not a substitute for a home in an unaffordable city region that needs housing to support agglomeration benefits. A New Town completing in the 2040s does not meet a shortfall in the next five years. A brownfield permission stalled by remediation costs is not equivalent to a serviced strategic site that can build now. Social housing can help absorption and meet acute need, but its delivery still requires land, developers and, under the funding model advocated by Shelter/NHF, a functioning private market to generate Section 106 contributions. It would address that one particular measure might work well in ten years, but would not be an effective solution in the current market. 
Creating a theory of change is not easy and it is much less satisfying than a silver bullet because it reinforces the hard choices. More brownfield development does not eliminate the case for Green Belt release. Equally, the latter does not remove the need to secure urban intensification. New Towns do not mean existing towns and villages do not need to grow. Social housing does not make market delivery irrelevant; any more than market delivery removes the need for affordable homes. An effective regime of Strategic and Local Plans can support longer term growth, but it will do relatively little or nothing for what gets built before the middle of the next decade and thus is no substitute for measures that support planning applications for sustainable development under the decision-making policies of the NPPF.
The practical conclusion is that tackling the housing crisis in England needs the whole lot. The policy aim should not be to choose the most attractive measures. It should be to understand the contribution, dependencies and failure triggers of each and then have in place a portfolio of approaches, some of which will deliver small marginal gains rather than what is counted in millions. These measures will then need continuous and rapid recalibration to rapid changes in different market cycles.
This blog started with the CPS/Create Streets report. It makes a useful contribution to the policy portfolio, strengthening the case for a more discriminating Green Belt policy and for serious consideration of rail-led growth. CPRE is on to something when it says brownfield capacity is an opportunity not be squandered. Shelter and the NHF are right that England needs far more Social Rent. And so on; there are lots of good ideas.
As the political parties inevitably begin contemplating their policy propositions for the next election (whenever that might be called),[22] the mistake would be for them not to think properly about how the different measures must work together. The housing crisis is the product of many factors, many of them embedded over decades. The tests for any manifesto housing target is simple: show us the theory of change, or it is just a number.

 

 

Footnotes
 
[1] Centre for Policy Studies, The Future of the Green Belt, October 2026:

[2] The Times, 'Green belt land could provide space for 4.6m homes', 21 October 2026 (£)
[3]Centre for Policy Studies, The Future of the Green Belt, executive summary and pp. 54-62
[4] See pp. 5 and 57-61 of the CPS Report. The calculations in the text use the report's published 152,347 hectares and its stated assumptions of 35 dwellings per hectare and 60% site utilisation
[5] Government response to the proposed reforms to the National Planning Policy Framework and other changes to the planning system consultation, August 2026
[6] See this summary by the TfL London Transport Museum
[7] Of course, Lichfields produced its own capacity-based estimates of the Government’s station-based policy in the draft and final NPPFs, albeit observing the challenges around land availability and density assumptions.”
[8]CPRE, State of Brownfield 2025, pp. 2 and 15
[9] See, for example, the Reform Planning Teal Paper
[10] The work by Shelter in its Brick by Brick: A Plan To Deliver the Social Homes We Need, July 2024
[11] See Building more homes won’t solve the housing crisis in the Architects’ Journal, 30 October 2024.
[12] CEBR for Shelter and the NHF, The economic impact of building social housing, February 2024 – as analysed in this Lichfields blog
[13] CPRE Press Announcement, Sept 2025
[14] ‘Get on and Build' Deputy Prime Minister urges housebuilders - GOV.UK
[15] For example, The 1.5 million-home question: Does the government’s planning reform programme add up? Building Magazine, January 2025
[16] Water supply, water treatment, nutrient neutrality, s.106 affordable home take-up and so on.
[17] New first-time buyer scheme to be confirmed at Budget - GOV.UK
[18] For example as advocated in Reforming the land market How land reform can help deliver the government target of 300,000 new homes per year. The numerical assumptions behind this were question in this Lichfields blog
[19] Who should own the value of land? Housing, power and the deep politics of land value capture Edward Shepherd and Tim White April 2026. This Lichfields blog provides a critique of its analysis
[20] See this Parliamentary Written Answer
[21] The idea of a Theory of Change was popularised by Carol Weiss in this 1995 article: "Nothing as Practical as Good Theory: Exploring Theory-Based Evaluation for Comprehensive Community Initiatives". More info and background: TOC Origins - Theory of Change Community
[22] Invoking Brenda from Bristol

 

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Scottish Biodiversity Metric Consultation

Scottish Biodiversity Metric Consultation

Josh Woollard & Katherine Bannister 23 Oct 2026
The current version of Scotland’s National Planning Framework (NPF4) sought to reshape the planning system to allow climate change and nature recovery to be considered in all plans and decisions, supporting development that benefits biodiversity. Policy 3 sets out that all national or major developments, or those subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), will only be supported where it can be demonstrated that significant biodiversity enhancements are provided in the proposal.
The absence of an established Scottish quantitative approach to assessment of biodiversity value has resulted in the use of an array of methods to calculate biodiversity enhancement (also referred to here as Biodiversity Net Gain (BNG)), including variations of the English statutory biodiversity metric. This has created discrepancies in BNG calculations, causing confusion and inconsistency within the planning system.
To address this, NatureScot announced a public consultation on the introduction of a Scottish Planning Biodiversity Metric (SPBM), starting on 31st August 2026 and ending on 30th November 2026. The SPBM draws upon the English statutory biodiversity metric, adapting it to better complement Scottish Policy and the diverse range of environments and landscapes it encompasses, and seeks to provide a consistent and transparent approach to calculating changes in biodiversity at a project level, in terms of habitat loss, compensation and enhancement in the Scottish system.

Key differences between the Scottish and English approaches

There are a number of differences between the two approaches to measuring and compensating for impacts to biodiversity, and we have highlighted some of these below.
Policy-Led vs Legislative

Whereas the English Government brought in a legal requirement for certain developments to deliver at least 10% BNG, the Scottish planning system has adopted a policy-led approach requiring certain developments to deliver “significant biodiversity enhancements” without requiring a specific numerical uplift. This allows for a more qualitative consideration of biodiversity and the SBPM includes a sheet which allows a user to add biodiversity measures, such as homes for bees, bats, bugs etc. Crucially, the SBPM doesn’t assign a value to these measures, but it does highlight a more holistic approach to delivering BNG, rather than “simply becoming ‘a numbers game’” as the User Guide suggests.
Spatial Risk

Both the English and proposed Scottish systems have introduced a mitigation hierarchy for biodiversity. These are broadly similar as they seek to:
 
  1. Avoid impact in the first place;

  2. Minimise impact;

  3. Restore or enhance on-site habitats; and

  4. Offset impacts through compensatory provision with a preference for on-site delivery over off-site delivery.

To further reinforce on-site delivery, both the proposed Scottish and English approaches apply a spatial risk multiplier.
In Scotland, the multiplier effect results in 1 Biodiversity Unit (BU) off-site being worth 0.9 BUs. The same multiplier is applied regardless of the distance from the site.
In England, the negative effect of the risk multiplier increase with distance from the development site. There is no negative impact for off-site delivery within the same Local Planning Authority (LPA) area or National Character Area (NCA). Within a neighbouring LPA or NCA, 1 BU becomes worth 0.75 BUs as compensation value. Beyond the neighbouring LPA or NCA, 1 BU is only worth 0.5 BUs as offsite compensation.[1]

Lessons learnt from the English system

Mandatory BNG has been in force in England since February 2024. Whilst there has undoubtably been a bedding-in period for the industry as understanding and training progresses, the challenges of implementing the new system are easing.
When to consider BNG?

There is no flexibility in England to factor in viability when meeting the BNG Requirement; delivering 10% BNG is a legislative requirement and cannot be reduced in any way.
It has become increasingly important to consider biodiversity at the outset, both in terms of site selection and the design process. The extent of high value habitats on site could significantly impact on developable area, particularly if the cost of mitigation, either on-site or off-site, is prohibitive.
Development of a wider BNG ecosystem

In the early period, the wider system (comprising the private market, Government guidance etc.) which now supports the implementation of mandatory BNG was in its infancy. In many cases, this caused significant delays to the planning process.
Now however, there is a functioning market for the sale of offsite BUs which facilitate developments that cannot deliver 10% BNG on-site. Many LPAs have published guidance and template legal agreements, and the Government are working to improve exemptions for England, streamline the Metric, increase flexibility for minor developments, and target specific issues such as open mosaic habitat on brownfield sites.

What opportunities does the Scottish BNG Metric present?

The main driver for, and key benefit of, the SBPM is to bring consistency to the measurement of biodiversity value in Scotland to support the delivery of NPF4, with the hope that it will improve outcomes for biodiversity improvements in Scotland.
The introduction of the SBPM also presents an opportunity for landowners, local authorities, and developers within Scotland to create their own habitat banks from which BUs can be traded. Unlike England, the Scottish spatial risk multiplier is not distance-dependent. It is logical therefore to assume the catchment within which a Scottish BU bank could serve would be wider as customers would not incur additional negative penalties.  

Questions to be answered

How will BNG be secured on a planning permission?

Through a legislative approach to delivering BNG, the English system imposes a standard planning condition to all relevant planning permissions securing mandatory BNG. With the policy-led approach in Scotland, the consultation does not consider how BNG could be secured. Whilst the SBPM will reduce inconsistency in one part of  the planning system, inconsistencies could remain around securing the delivery of biodiversity enhancements. Clarification on this would likely be welcomed.
Will a Biodiversity Gain Site Register be created?

A Biodiversity Gain Site Register, managed by Natural England, records all Biodiversity Gain sites where offsite biodiversity enhancements are planned or delivered in England. The Register, use of which is mandatory, is a key part of the BNG system in England and supports the functioning of the private market. The Scottish consultation does not indicate whether it is intended for a similar a Register to be created to enable a similar “market” for BUs in Scotland. This risks delays to the planning system if off-site BUs are not available to mitigate impacts of new developments.
 

How can Lichfields assist?

Lichfields are well versed in the implementation of mandatory BNG in England and are well placed to apply this knowledge to assist clients in drafting representations to the ongoing Scottish consultation.

 

Footnotes
 
[1] It is worth noting that the English Government are intending to move away from LPA/NCA boundaries and towards Local Nature Recovery Strategy areas which, in the main, cover much larger areas.

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Harvey Nichols and the Changing Face of Leeds City Centre
When I arrived in Leeds as a student in 2005, the city of Leeds was riding high on its reputation as one of the North’s great shopping destinations. Leeds was regularly described as the “Knightsbridge of the North”, a place where ambitious retail developments, luxury brands and new department stores helped define the city’s identity.
Shopping was a major part of what made Leeds feel different from other cities. The city had a confidence about it, with a retail offer that could compete with much larger destinations. Harvey Nichols, which had opened on Briggate in 1996, was an important part of that story: a statement of intent that Leeds belonged on the map of luxury retail.
Nearly two decades later, the news that the Harvey Nichols moniker will no longer feature over the shop door feels like the end of an era. Following its acquisition by Frasers Group in August 2026, the company has confirmed plans to convert the Leeds store into a Flannels. The building may continue to trade as a luxury fashion destination, but the Harvey Nichols brand, and everything associated with it — is set to disappear.

Harvey Nichols

For many, that will be a genuine loss. Yet, to understand what it means for Leeds, we need to look beyond one retailer and consider how dramatically the city centre has changed since I first arrived.
 
 

From the Knightsbridge of the North to a new retail landscape

 

The years around my arrival in Leeds were a period of considerable optimism for the city’s retail sector. New developments promised to strengthen its position as a regional shopping powerhouse, bringing fresh investment, more choice and a more modern shopping experience, even in the face of new, out-of-centre competition from the White Rose Shopping centre.
The opening of Trinity Leeds in 2013 was a major moment. Its arrival brought together shopping, restaurants and leisure in a prominent city-centre location, creating a new focal point for visitors. The development helped reinforce Leeds’ reputation as a place to shop, eat and spend time, rather than simply a destination for ticking items off a shopping list.
Meanwhile, the transformation of the Victoria Quarter into part of the wider Victoria Leeds offer, alongside the arrival of John Lewis at Victoria Gate in 2016, added another dimension to the city’s retail identity. The combination of historic architecture, luxury brands and a major department store gave Leeds a distinctive proposition.
At the time, it was easy to see these developments as evidence that the city’s retail future was secure. New shopping destinations were opening, major brands were investing, and Leeds seemed well placed to attract shoppers from across Yorkshire and beyond.
But retail is not a static industry. The very developments that helped Leeds flourish were being built during a period when the way people shop was beginning to change. Online retail was growing, consumer habits were evolving, and the traditional department-store model was coming under increasing pressure.
The changes that followed would challenge some of the assumptions on which that earlier confidence had been built.

The changing geography of Leeds shopping

 

One of the most interesting developments since 2005 has been the gradual shift in the centre of gravity for shopping.
When I first arrived, Briggate and the surrounding streets were central to the city's retail identity. Harvey Nichols was a major attraction, while the established shopping streets and department stores helped define the experience of visiting Leeds.
The subsequent development of Trinity and Victoria Gate helped draw attention eastwards, particularly towards the John Lewis store at Victoria Gate, which opened in 2016.

Trinity Leeds Shopping Centre

This was more than a change in the location of individual shops. It altered the way people moved through the city centre and where they chose to spend their time.
Newer developments offered modern retail environments, a carefully curated mix of brands and, in some cases, a more integrated food and leisure experience. As these destinations became established, older shopping areas faced the challenge of remaining relevant in a more competitive market.
John Lewis has become especially significant in this story. With the loss of traditional department-store names elsewhere, it will soon become the last remaining major department store in Leeds city centre. Its presence at Victoria Gate is a reminder of the city's continuing appeal as a regional retail destination, even as the wider department-store model comes under pressure.
But it also raises an important question: what happens when a city becomes increasingly reliant on a small number of major retail anchors?
The fortunes of those individual stores can have an outsized influence on the surrounding streets and businesses. A successful anchor can attract visitors and support neighbouring retailers, while its decline can leave a substantial gap in the local economy.

Evolution to re-calibration?

 

In September 2026, Leeds City Council reported that the vacancy rate across the city’s main retail area had fallen to 8.8% — its lowest level since records began in 2019. The council also reported more than 45 million pedestrian movements across eight key city-centre locations during the year to that point. These figures suggest that, despite the challenges facing traditional retail and the changing mix of occupiers, Leeds continues to attract significant footfall and demonstrates encouraging signs of resilience. A number of developments across Leeds city centre provide an insight into how its retail landscape is evolving in this context.
One of the most recent examples is the demolition of The Core Shopping Centre. Opened in 1987 as the Headrow Shopping Centre, it was once an important part of Leeds’ evolving retail offer. However, over time, it struggled to maintain its position alongside newer developments and changing consumer habits, eventually becoming largely vacant in its final years.

 

Garnet Exchange development site

Its redevelopment as the Garnet Exchange reflects a different vision for the city centre. Rather than simply replacing one shopping destination with another, the scheme signals a shift towards mixed-use development, combining commercial space with residential accommodation. Plans include ground-floor commercial units alongside hundreds of student flats above.
In effect, a building once designed primarily to accommodate shoppers is being reimagined as a place where people can live, work and spend money. This reflects a broader recognition that successful city centres need to offer more than retail alone.
Elsewhere, other developments highlight the opportunities and challenges facing Leeds’ retail offer.
Leeds Kirkgate Market remains an important city-centre destination, drawing visitors through its mix of independent traders, fresh produce and specialist retailers. The introduction of a casual food and drink offer has also helped broaden its appeal, creating a more flexible space for emerging businesses and new concepts. However, like many traditional markets, it continues to face pressures from rising operating costs and the changing economics of independent retail.
Leeds Corn Exchange demonstrates the potential of repurposing historic buildings to create distinctive retail destinations. Its architectural character and independent retail offer provide something different from the conventional shopping centre experience and undoubtedly provides a draw to visitors. Yet its occupancy has fluctuated over time, underlining the challenge of sustaining a specialist retail destination in an increasingly competitive market.

Leeds Corn Exchange

 

The Light, on The Headrow, provides another example of how a city-centre development can evolve. While retail remains part of its offer, leisure has become increasingly prominent, with restaurants, bars, a gym and a cinema helping to attract visitors beyond traditional shopping hours. Its evolution illustrates the growing importance of food, drink and recreation in encouraging people to spend time in the city centre.
The changing use of buildings is not limited to retail and leisure. The former Majestyk nightclub, close to Leeds railway station, has been transformed into high-quality office space. Although not a retail redevelopment, it highlights the wider transition taking place across the city, as buildings find new purposes in response to changing demand.
Taken together, these examples demonstrate how Leeds continues to adapt to new patterns of working, shopping and entertainment. Some buildings are being repurposed, others are diversifying their offer, and some are moving away from retail altogether. The common thread is the need to respond to how people want to use the city today, rather than relying on models that may no longer be sustainable.
Ultimately, the future of a successful city centre does not depend on preserving every former shopping centre or filling every vacant unit with another retailer. Harvey Nichols will no doubt be missed in Leeds but retail will undoubtedly remain an important part of the city’s evolving identity and economy.
A more sustainable future is likely to lie in a broader mix of uses, where shopping sits alongside residential, office, leisure, hospitality and cultural activities. By bringing more people into the city for different reasons and at different times of the day, Leeds has the opportunity to create a city centre that is not only commercially resilient but also more vibrant, accessible and appealing.

 

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